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CONTROL OF HIGHWAY ACCESS- ITS
PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS
WILLIAM H. GIBBES*
I. THE NEW SYSTEM OF CONTROLLED ACCESS
HIGHWAYS UNDER THE INTERSTATE PROGRAM
For several years it has been apparent to local and na-
tional highway officials, safety committees, and other inter-
ested groups that a tremendous need existed for expansion
and improvement of the national system of highways. In ad-
dition to the ever increasing traffic congestion on the high-
ways, the inadequacies of present highway facilities have
been forcefully demonstrated by the mounting annual toll
of over 40,000 highway fatalities and about 1,400,000 injuries,
not even to mention the staggering annual economic loss of
about $5,000,000,000.1
The need for a safe and efficient road network in the in-
terest of national defense and the expanding economy was
recognized by the Congress with the enactment of the Fed-
eral Aid Highway Act of 1956 which was signed into law by
the President on June 29, 1956.2 Under this legislation, con-
struction of 41,000 miles of controlled access highways was
authorized for the nation at an estimated total cost, at that
time, of 37.6 billion dollars. The State of South Carolina,
under the interstate program, was authorized 680 miles of
newly designed, four-lane, controlled access highways at an
estimated cost, at that time, of $340,000,000.
The plans for the new highways show that they are being
designed to meet the traffic needs of the future as well as
to relieve the present day congested conditions existing upon
our highways. The new routes in the interstate system, four
of which will stretch across South Carolina, will carry about
20% of the nation's traffic on slightly more than 1% of the
total road and street mileage in the country. Nationally, these
interstate routes will extend into or pass through 48 states,
connecting 42 state capitals, and joining 90% of all cities in
the United States with a population of over 50,000.
*Assistant Attorney General of South Carolina; B.S., 1952, Univer-
sity of South Carolina; LL.B., 1953, University of South Carolina;
member Richland County and South Carolina Bar Associations.
1. THE PRESIDENT's COMMITTEE FOR TRAFFIC SAFETY, THE NEW
FEDERAL AID HIGHWAY PROGRAM (1957).
2. 70 STAT. 374,23 U. S. C. § 60 (1956).
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The numbers of the four interstate routes which will ex-
tend through South Carolina are 26, 85, 20, and 95. Inter-
state Route 26, the Charleston-Spartanburg-Knoxville route,
which is all upon new location, should be open for travel in
1960. Route 85, in Spartanburg and Cherokee Counties, two
lanes of which was existing U. S. Route 29, is the most ad-
vanced of all the state's interstate projects. One section
of this route, however, in Anderson and Oconee Counties,
which will connect Interstate 85 with the same route in the
State of Georgia, is yet to be constructed, as the location
has not been determined. The two remaining routes, Inter-
states 95 and 20, are not as yet under contract, but work
should commence on Interstate 20 in 1960. Interstate 95,
which will be on new location except for a short section in
Jasper County, will extend through the eastern section of
the State, passing through Dillon and Florence Counties and
by the cities of Summerton and Savannah. Interstate 20, all
of which will be on new location, will pass by Augusta, Co-
lumbia, Camden, and connect with Interstate 95 near the
city of Florence.
These new highways will be of the four-lane divided, fully
controlled access type, with each highway having at least
two twelve-foot wide traffic lanes in each direction, and ten-
foot paved shoulders. Opposing traffic lanes will be divided
by a thirty-six-foot median strip. There will be no intersec-
tions at grade level and no stop signs or traffic lights on the
main highway. Traffic entering or leaving the main high-
ways will do so at safe, conveniently located interchange
areas. However, under construction plans for these new con-
trolled access highways, abutting property owners will not
be cut off entirely from the highway either on new locations
or where existing conventional highways are converted into
controlled access facilities, as they will be served by land
service or frontage roads as need arises.3
From analysis of the records, safety experta conserva-
tively estimate that the interstate system, alone, when com-
pleted, will save at least 3,500 lives every year - 35,000 lives
in its first ten years of existence.4
3. Information on new Interstate Routes with respect to design,
plans, progress of construction, effect, etc., furnished by Office of Chief
Highway Commissioner, State of South Carolina.
4. THE PRESIDENT'S CommIrrEE FOR TRAFFIC SAFETY, supra note 1.
Vol. 12
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II. THE RIGHT OF ACCESS
A. Origin
The right of access of an owner of property abutting on
an existing street or highway has been generally recognized
by the courts.5 This right has been described by the decisions
as an "easement appurtenant" to the abutting property,6 and
it encompasses not only the ability of the abutting landowner
to enter and leave his property by way of the public highway,
but also establishes the accessibility of his premises for his
friends, clients, and customers.7 But the matter of defining
the extent of the right of access and the abutting property
owner's interests with respect thereto has been a source of
great difficulty to the courts for many years. Salient recog-
nition of the problem appears in the following words of the
United States Supreme Court :8
The right of an owner of land abutting on public high-
ways has been a fruitful source of litigation in the Courts
of all the States, and the decisions have been conflict-
ing, and often in the same State, irreconcilable in prin-
ciple. The Courts have modified or overruled their own
decisions, and each State has in the end fixed and lim-
ited, by legislation or judicial decision, the rights of
abutting landowners in accordance with its own view of
the law and public policy.
A review of the history of the right of access does not re-
veal with any degree of certainty where it originated. The old
English cases recognized the principle that abutting prop-
erty owners had a personal right of access to a public high-
way which could not be interfered with by another private
individual.9 But these cases are not very helpful in consider-
ing sovereign interference on behalf of the public because
the principle of eminent domain is not recognized in England
by the "Constitution", and compensation can only be made
5. Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P. 2d 818 (1943);
People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390, 144 P. 2d 799 (1943); 10 McQUnL-
LN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 647 (3d ed. 1950).
6. Rose v. California, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 105 P. 2d 302 (1942) ; Story v.
New York Elevated R. R., 90 N. Y. 122 (1882); 25 Am. JuR. Highways
§ 154 (1940); 39 0. J. S. Highways § 141 (1944); 28 C. J. S. Ease-
ments §§ 1-4 (1941).
7. Longnecker v. Wichita Ry. & Light Co., 80 Kan. 413, 102 Pac. 492
(1909); 10 MCQUIILIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 671 (3d ed. 1950).
8. Saur v. New York, 206 U. S. 536, 548 (1906).
9. Berridge v. Ward, 2 F. & F. 208, 175 Eng. Rep. 1026 (N. P. 1860);
Ramuz v. The Southend Local Board, 67 L. T. 169 (1892).
1960]
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when specifically authorized by statute.' 0 The American de-
cisions lend very little assistance in determination of the
source of the right of access, although it is generally believed
that this right was an outgrowth of the basic purpose of the
public highway. This view is reflected by the following state-
ment of the California Supreme Court:"
The precise origin of that property right is somewhat
obscure, but it may be said generally to have arisen by
Court decision declaring that such right existed and rec-
ognizing it.
Notwithstanding this, Mr. Justice Holmes, in Muhlker v. New
York and Harlem RR. Co. 12 asserted that if at the outset the
courts had decided that, apart from statute or express grant,
the abutters on a street had only the rights of the public
and no private easement of any kind, it would not have been
surprising.
In this country, the idea of access rights in all probability
originated with the celebrated New York elevated railway
cases. 13 Under the New York statutes, the establishment of
streets was viewed as a trust created for the benefit of the
public at large as well as the abutting property owners. The
exclusion of the public, and the diversion of the streets to
private use, violated the rights of abutting owners, author-
izing them to recover all property-value losses they could
trace to the breach of trust. But only a few years thereafter
the United States Supreme Court ruled that abutters' rights
are subordinate to any reasonable use of the street made by
public authorities to facilitate general travel, and the de-
cisions of the states have since followed this principle.' 4
A general review of the decisions seems to reflect that
the right of access evolved from a recognition of the basic
use of the highway and the legal obligation of the public to
preserve the highway for that use. From the earliest times
10. 16 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND 253 (2d ed. 1935).
11. Bacich v. Board of Control, supra note 5.
12. 197 U. S. 544 (1905); see also Stanwood v. City of Malden, 157
Mass. 17 (1892).
13. Lahr v. Metropolitan Elevated Ry., 104 N. Y. 268, 10 N. E. 528
(1887) ; Story v. New York Elevated R. R., 90 N. Y. 122 (1882).
14. ,Qaur v. City of New York, supra note 8; Adams v. Commissioners
of Town of Trappe, 204 Md. 165, 102 A. 2d 830 (1954); McGowan v.
City of Burns, 172 Ore. 63, 137 P. 2d 994 (1943) ; King v. Stark County,
66 N. D. 467, 266 N. W. 654 (1936) ; State v. Nelson, 189 Minn. 87, 248
N. W. 751 (1933). See State Highway Department v. Butterfield, 216
S. C. 463, 58 S. E. 2d 737 (1950); Leppard v. Central Carolina Tele-
phone Co., 205 S. C. 1, 30 S. E. 2d 755 (1944).
[Vol. 12
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in our history, through the days of the horse and buggy and
model "T" Ford, highways were built and utilized primarily
for the purpose of giving access to farms, plantations, homes
and business establishments. This is the original concept of
the "land service road". Originally, the landowner usually
dedicated a portion of his land for the road-way and helped
build it, either with his own labor or through the payment of
assessments. Under these circumstances, each of the abutting
landowners was considered to have the right of access to this
road which was, after all, built to give him access. Under
these circumstances to deny access would defeat the very
purpose and object of the road. The courts have recognized
in a variety of ways the legal obligation to protect "land
service". In some cases this recognition has been under the
"natural rights" theory that access is just one of the inher-
ent property rights of the ownership and enjoyment of
land ;15 in other cases the courts' explanations have been based
on the transaction by which the street or highway was es-
tablished. 6
B. Extent
Irrespective of the source of the right, the principle has
apparently evolved that the easement of access which the
judiciary has declared to exist is subject to the fullest exer-
cise of the primary right of public travel, out of which the
right sprang, and that any change in the street or highway
for the benefit of the public travel is a matter of public right.
In general, the extent of the right of access may be summar-
ized by saying that an abutter on an existing highway has
only the right to get into the street or highway in front of
his property and thence, in a reasonable manner, to the gen-
eraI system of streets or highways. 1 7 This view is supported
in the recent decision of the Iowa Supreme Court in Iowa
State Highway Commission v. Smith:'
It seems fairly well settled that, while access may not be
entirely cut off, an owner is not entitled, as against the
public, to access to his land at all points between it and
15. In 'e Forsstrom, 44 Aiz. 472, 38 P. 2d 878 (1934); City of
Denver v. Bayer, 7 Colo. 113, 2 Pac. 6 (1883); Rigney v. City of Chi-
cago, 102 Ill. 64 (1882).
16. Eachus v. Los Angeles Ry., 103 Cal. 614, 37 Fae. 750 (1894;
Story v. New York Elevated P.. R., supra note 13; Lahr v. Metropoli-
tan Elevated R. R., supra note 13.
17. Lnwis, EMINENT DoAnIs 190 (9d ed. 1909y, 25 AM. Jum. High.-
waye § 154 (1940).
1i. 248 Iowa 869; 82 X. W. 2d 755, 785, 786 (1957).
19601
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the highway. If he has free and convenient access to his
property and the improvements on it and his means of
ingress and egress are not substantially interfered with
by the public he has no cause for complaint ...
With recognition of the principle that the rights of abutting
property owners are subordinate to the right of the public
to the proper use of the highway, it becomes apparent that
the exercise of the rights of abutting owners is subject to
reasonable regulation and restriction for the purpose of fur-
nishing safe highways for the public use. Regulations, how-
ever, cannot be sustained which unduly limit or unreason-
.ubly interfere with the rights of abutting property owners.
Mere interference with or slight disturbance of the rights of
abutting owners by imposition of new uses on the highway
consistent with highway purposes and usages must be toler-
ated in the overriding interest of the public welfare and
safety. Historically, it may be noted that traffic laws and
laws pertaining to the construction and use of streets and
highways have been consistently upheld although such laws
may indirectly affect access. Thus, the police power has been
used to establish one-way streets,'9 divided highways,2 0 or-
dinances prohibiting U-turns or left turns,21 vehicle size and
weight laws,22 and parking meters where their erection in-
terfered with access.2 3 In addition thereto, the "circuity of
travel" and "diversion of traffic" cases24 would appear to
cover, in principle, the establishment of land service or front-
age roads and the restriction of access from property which
previously abutted upon and had access to a main highway
under the police power. But some cases have held that this
involves compensable damage under eminent domain.2 5 The
police power has been held adequate to support reasonable
denial of a request for a new means of access to a street where
19. Chissell v. Baltimore, 193 Md. 535, 69 A. 2d 53 (1949); Cava-
maugh v. Gerk, 313 Mo. 375, 280 S. W. 51 (1926).
20. Iowa State Highway Commission v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 82
N. W. 2d 755 (1957); People v. Thompson, 260 P. 2d 658 (Cal. Dist.
Ut. 1953) ; People v. Sayig, 101 Cal. App. 2d 890, 226 P. 2d 702 (1951);
Fort Smith v. Van Zandt, 197 Ark 91, 122 S. W. 2d 187 (1938).
21. Iowa State Highway Commission v. Smith, supra note 20; Jones
Beach Blvd. Estate v. Moses, 268 N. Y. 362. 197 N. E. 313, 100 A. L. R.
487 (1935).
22. Wilbur v. City of Newton, 301 Mass. 97, 16 N. E. 2d 86, 121
A. L. R. 570 (1938).
23. Morris v. City of Salem, 179 Ore. 666, 174 P. 2d 192 (1946).
24. See cases cited in notes 52 and 63, infra.
25. State v. Marion Cir. Ct., 153 N. E. 2d 327 (Ind. 1958); Blount
County v. McPherson, 105 So. 2d 117 (Ala. 1958); Annot., 43 A. L. R.
2d 1072 (1955) ; People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390, 144 P. 2d 799 (1943).
[Vol. 12
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alternate or other reasonable access exists to that street or
some other street.2 6 In one of the best documented cases clari-
fying this proposition, the Court said :27
The absolute prohibition of drive-ways to an abutting
owner's land which fronts on a single thoroughfare, and
which cannot be reached by any other means, is unlaw-
ful and will not be sustained. But the public authorities
have the undoubted right to regulate the manner of the
use of drive-ways by adopting such rules and regula-
tions, in the interest of public safety, as will accord some
measure of access and yet permit public safety, as will
accord some measure of access and yet permit public
travel with with a minimum of danger. The rules and
regulations must be reasonable, striking a balance be-
tween the public and private interest. The abutter can-
not make a business of his right of access in deroga-
tion of the rights of the traveling public. He is entitled
only to make such use of his right of access as is con-
sonant with traffic conditions and police requirements
that are reasonable and uniform.
The Supreme Court of North Dakota has recognized reason-
able regulation, as is reflected by its statement :2s
It is well settled that the state may prevent access to
the road at certain places where public safety requires
it and thus may interfere with and even prevent ac-
cess at a specific point and shut it off entirely. But this
is not the damage to private property prohibited by the
Constitution. Access at another point must be allowed
even though it may be less convenient.
But, even with the numerous decisions on the subject of
access, forty-five of the state legislatures have thought that
the common law principles relating to the control of high-
way access were insufficient to meet all the problems which
arise in connection with such highways and that new legal
tools in the form of statutes were needed. The District of
Columbia, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, Alaska, and
26. Farmers-Kissinger Market House Co. v. Reading, 310 Pa. 493
165 Ati. 398 (1933); Town of Tilton v. Sharpe, 85 N. H. 138, 155 Atl.
44 (1931). See State ex reZ Gebelin v. Dept. of Highways, 200 La. 409,
8 So. 2d 71 (1942); Brenig v. Allegheny County, 232 Pa. 474, 2 A. 2d
842 (1938). Contra, Brownlow v. O'Donoghue Bros., 276 Fed. 636, 22
A.L.R. 939 (App. D. C. 1921).
27. Brenig v. Allegheny County, supra note 26.
28. King v. Stark County, 66 N. D. 467, 266 N. W. 654 (1936).
19601
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Hawaii have no legislation on the subject. Thirty-three of
these states which have legislation, including South Carolina,
have specific provisions authorizing the construction and des-
ignation of both existing and new highways as controlled ac-
cess facilities. The remaining states do not have specific pro-
visions dealing with this matter, but in some of these states
the authority seems to be assumed in other sections of their
statutes.
20
In South Carolina the Supreme Court has not yet had oc-
casion to construe the right of access and the respective rights
of abutting property owners as recognized and defined un-
der the new controlled access law,30 but over the years there
has been apparent recognition of the existence of the right
of access by the decisions of our Court. One of the best state-
ments recognizing the principle comes from Mr. Justice Fish-
burne in the case of Brown v. Hendricks:31
The right of the abutting property owner to access over
the street adjacent to his property as an appurtenance to
his property, and to have such access protected from
material obstruction, has been recognized by many of the
Courts, including our own. [Citing cases]
In the same decision the Court had already noted the obvious
inconsistency and lack of uniformity in cases involving the
right of access:
The decisions of the Courts upon the right of the abutting
property owners to recover where his access is obstructed
on one street, but where he has a means of access from
another street, are not uniform.
In recognizing the right the Court has also in an older
case32 apparently recognized the general rule that an abut-
ting property owner's private right of access in the street
or highway is subordinate to the public easement. The Court
held in this case that the abutting owner is only entitled
to reasonable access to the street and will not be compensated
where the route to the street is merely made more circuitous
and inconvenient. The Court stated:
The only question being, as we have said, whether the.
29. HIGHWAY RESEARCH BOARD PUBLICATION No. 482, EXraESswAY-
LAW (1957).
30. Act No. 621 of 1956.
31. 211 S. C 395, 45 S. E,2d 603 (1947).
32. Cherry v. Rock Hill, 48 S. C. 553, 26 S. E. 798 (1897.
[Vol. 12
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complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action, our first inquiry here, what is the gravamen of
the Plaintiff's complaint? Manifestly it is that the City
Council has, without lawful authority, closed, as it is
expressed in the Complaint, one of the public streets
of the City of Rock Hill, a public highway, whereby the
Plaintiff has sustained damage, not by reason of being
denied the access to his place of residence or to his place
of business, for there is no such allegation in the Com-
plaint, but solely because the Plaintiff has thereby been
forced 'to take a more circuitous and difficult route, in
going to and from his place of residence to his place
of business ... '
So far as appears from the allegations of the Complaint,
the only right which the Plaintiff had in the street in
question was the right, to which in common with all
other citizens, he was entitled, of using this street as a
public highway. That right is not, in our judgment, pri-
vate property protected by the constitutional provision
which is invoked.
In a more recent case,33 in apparent recognition of this view,
the South Carolina Supreme Court, in an action by an abutt-
ing landowner for damages and an injunction to restrain ob-
struction of an alleged neighborhood road, held that the de-
fendant was entitled to a non-suit because the plaintiff had
failed to prove any special damages as the result of the clos-
ing of the neighborhood road, but that he had sustained only
such damages as had been suffered by the public generally
as a direct result of the obstruction of the road.
While there is no doubt that the old decisions will influence
the Court's thinking on the matter of the right of access when
it has a specific case up for consideration under the new law,
the Court will be confronted in the future with a somewhat
different situation because of the apparent recognition un-
der the new controlled access law of the right of the State
to regulate or control the right of access under the police
power. This obvious recognition comes directly from the head-
lines or "whereas clauses" of the Act,34 which are set forth
as follows:
Whereas, the General Assembly finds that traffic acci-
33. Leitzey v. Fellers,181 S. C. 401, 187 S. E. 740 (1936).
34. See headlines or "whereas clauses", Act No. 621 of 1956, Acts
and Joint Resolutions of S. C. 1594,1595 (1956).
19601
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dents are occuring on the public highways of the State
in an ever increasing number, resulting in an irrepar-
able loss of life, limb and property; and,
Whereas, many of such accidents are caused by vehicles
entering the main through highways from drive-ways
and side roads; and,
Whereas, such accidents can be greatly reduced in num-
ber and severity by controlling access to and egress from
the main traveled way to suitable safe points, as deter-
mined by engineering principles; and, '
Whereas, a program providing for controlled access facil-
ities is necessary to preserve highway capacities, pro-
mote economic motor vehicle operation, stabilize and
enhance the value of abutting and community property,
safeguard the existing investment in major highways,
protect abutting enterprises, preserve aesthetic quali-
ties of the landscape, and otherwise assist in the orderly
development of communities; and,
Whereas, the General Assembly defines, determines and
declares that this Act is necessary for the preservation
of the public peace, health and safety, and for the pro-
motion of general welfare.
Section 3 of the Act,3r not considering all of the other
specific regulatory provisions, discussed hereinafter, provides
generally for the control or regulation of the right of access
on the new highways:
The Department may so design any controlled access
facility and so regulate or prohibit access as to best serve
the traffic for which such facility is intended. No person
shall have any right of access or egress to, from or across
the controlled access facilities to or from abutting prop-
erty or lands, except at such designated places at which
access may be permitted, upon such terms and conditions
as may be specified from time to time by the Department.
As has already been noted, extensive controlled access high-
way construction is presently underway in this State and no
doubt numerous varied questions involving the right of access
will be presented to the courts as a result of construction of
the interstate program. It will be interesting to observe the
35. See note 30 supra.
[Vol. 12
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future course of the decisions with respect to the right of ac-
cess under the new controlled access highway laws.
III. CONTROL OF ACCESS ON NEW LOCATIONS.
Where there is recognition of the principle that the right
of access does not exist legally until a highway is open to the
public for travel, the new location and construction of a con-
trolled access highway would appear to cause no particu-
lar difficulty. The factual situation created and the legal
implications resulting therefrom should not differ greatly
from that presented when the State acquires property for
the construction of a conventional "land service" road. When
a new right of way for a controlled access highway is ac-
quired through a 'person's property, compensation should
be awarded for the land taken and "severance damages"
for the separation of the property which may arise from the
taking, but there should be no compensation to the landowner
for the loss of a right of access which he never had. The con-
trol of access merely detracts from the possible beneficial
value which the construction of the new highway might cre-
ate and in most, instances would limit the possibilities of an
abutting owner to gain any benefit from the new construc-
tion unless his property is located near an interchange or
other access point. While it would appear academic that a
landowner should not be compensated for the loss of access
on new location, at least one court apparently considers it
as an element of damage under certain circumstances.3 6 The
majority of jurisdictions, however, follow the reasoning that
there can be no damage to a right which never existed and
no compensation for a loss not sustained.31 In one of the lead-
ing cases on the subject, the California Supreme Court said :88
The sole issue before us is whether the landowners ac-
quired a right of direct access as the result of the con-
struction of the free-way. Where a property owner has
36. In the Illinois case of Dept. of Public Welfare v. Wolf, 414 Ill.
386, 111 N. E. 2d 232 (1953), the Court held that if a highway right of
way is acquired and dedicated without a prohibition of access to the
abutters, an interest in access arises immediately even though the road
has not been opened or even paved.
37. State v. Clevenger, 291 S. W. 2d 57 (Mo. 1956); Carazalla v.
State of Wisconsin, 269 Wis. 593, 71 N. W. 2d 276 (19555; Robinson v.
State, 207 Misc. 325, 137 N. Y. S. 2d 673 (1955); Smick v. Common-
wealth, 268 S. W. 2d 424 (Ky. 1954); Schnider v. State, 38 Cal. 2d
439, 241 P. 2d 1 (1952); People v. Sack, 202 Misc. 571, 110 N. Y. S. 2d
556 (1952).
38. Schnider v. State, suprm note 37.
1960]
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no right of direct access to a highway before it is con-
verted into a free-way abutting upon his property, noth-
ing is taken from him by the failure to give him such a
right when the conversion takes place. The construction
of the free-way, pursuant to the resolution, did not create
new rights of access in favor of land which did not abut
upon the highway as it formerly existed. Where an or-
dinary or conventional road is built, there may be an in-
tent to serve abutting owners, but when a free-way is es-
tablished the intent is just the opposite, and a resolution
creating a free-way gives adequate notice that no new
rights of access will arise unless they are specifically
granted.
A situation which somewhat parallels the new location of
a controlled access highway is created when an existing con-
ventional highway is relocated and access to it is controlled.
However, this factual situation presents no particular diffi-
culty because the decisions treat it the same as if the reloca-
tion were merely the new location of a controlled access fa-
cility. 0 The Oregon Supreme Court in a recent case4o sus-
tained the validity of an instruction of a lower Court to the
effect that the defendant landowners had no right or easement
of access between their land and relocated portion of the high-
way, and that the jury, in determining the fair cash market
value of all such land, should not consider that the owners had
a pertinent right or easement of access, and that in deter-
mining the value of remaining land not taken, they should
not consider that it had any such right or easement taken
from it; and, hence, should not allow any damage for a tak-
ing of access.
A related problem which sometimes arises with the con-
struction of a new controlled access facility is the confusion
of severance damages with special damages that are per-
mitted by most jurisdictions when the right of access to an
existing highway is completely destroyed. Where a single
tract of land is divided into two separate tracts by the new
location of a controlled access highway, the owner of such
property is entitled to special damages in the form of sever-
ance damages. A severance damage does not arise from the
loss of any rights associated with the highway, but it would
39. Carazalla v. State of Wisconsin, supra note 37; State Highway
Commission v. Burke, 205 P. 2d 783 (Ore. 1954); State v. Clevenger,
supra note 37.
40. State Highway Commission v. Burke, supra note 39.
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have occurred just the same as if the tract of land had been
severed for the construction of a conventional land service
road or any other purpose.41 However, when a tract of land
is divided by the construction of a new highway, severance
damages may be greater than those occasioned by the cross-
ing of a conventional highway because of the increased diffi-
culty in using the separate parcels of the tract as an eco-
nomic unit. An increase in severance damages may not occur
if the separate parcels of a divided tract are connected by a
land service road which passes either over or under the new
controlled access facility. If an increase in damages does occur
on a new location, it does not result from the taking of any
right of access in the highway, but comes about merely from
the separation for the construction of a controlled access
facility and is considered in determining the after value of
the remaining lands after the severance takes place.
In South Carolina no particular problem should arise with
respect to the right of access on new locations of controlled
access facilities. The new Controlled Access Statute42 spe-
cifically covers this situation:
Along new highway locations abutting property owners
shall not be entitled as a matter of right, to access to
such new locations, and any denial of such rights of ac-
cess shall not be deemed as grounds for special damages.
No serious question apparently can be raised with respect
to the validity or constitutionality of the Act because of its
regulation of access on new locations, as it is noted that the
validity of similar acts in other states regulating access has
been sustained as necessary regulation under the police power
of the state.
43
IV. CONTROL OF ACCESS ON EXISTING HIGHWAYS
A. Total Obstruction of Access
It can be stated confidently that the greatest legal prob-
lems that can be associated with the construction of con-
41. Cf. 1 ORGEL ON VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOmAIN § 47, 54
(2d ed. 1953); Annot., 6 A. L. R. 2d 1199 (1949).
42. Section 4, Act. No. 621 of 1956.
43. State v. Superior Court, 287 P. 2d 494 (Wash. 1955); Wiseman v.
Merrill, 99 N. H. 256, 109 A. 2d 42 (1954); Dept. of Public Works
and Buildings v. Lanter, 413 Ill. 581, 110 N. E. 2d 179 (1953); Holt v.
Board of Commissioners of Okla. County, 205 0ka 178, 236 P. 2d 476
(1951) ; Zeigler v. Witherspoon, 331 Mich. 337, 49 N. W. 2d 318 (1951) ;
Neuweiler v. Kauer, 107 N. E. 2d 779 (Ohio 1951) ; Holloway v. Purcell,
35 Cal. 2d 220, 217 P. 2d 665 (1950).
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trolled access highways arise when the State converts an ex-
isting conventional land service road into a controlled ac-
cess facility. Such a conversion occurs when highway offi-
cials erect a fence or other obstruction such as a grass or
concrete median strip along an existing highway and there-
after only permit entry by an abutting landowner into the
main highway at specified points from a parallel or front-
age road or by other means. As a result of this conversion,
an abutting landowner may have his access to the main high-
way completely cut off or curtailed considerably from that
which he originally had when his property directly abutted
upon the main traffic artery. If, as a result of controlling
access on an existing conventional highway, an abutting
landowner's access to such highway is completely obstructed,
it would obviously appear that he is entitled to compensa-
tion for the taking of this right of access under eminent do-
main. It is noted, however, that some few cases have held
to the contrary.4 4 The measure of damages or the amount of
compensation to which the landowner would be entitled in
this factual situation is determined by consideration of the
fair market value of the property before the right of access
is taken and after it is taken. The difference in the two fig-
ures is the damage for the total loss or obstruction of access.
Where there is a total obstruction or abridgement of the
right of access as a result of controlling access on an exist-
ing highway, the preponderance of authority recognizes that
a landowner is entitled to compensation.
45
B. Restriction of Access
While the question of total obstruction of access resolves it-
self rather simply, the greater problem arises when an abutt-
ing landowner's access to an existing highway is severely
restricted or curtailed by control of access thereon. This
diminution of access usually occurs when a landowner abuts
upon a conventional highway and after designation of that
highway as a controlled access facility, he abuts on a front-
age or land service road which only enters the main high-
way at designated access points. By such control of access
44. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., v. Murdock, 165 Misc. 713, 1 N. Y. S.
2d 574 (Sup. Ct. 1937); Barrett v. Union Bridge Co., 117 Ore. 220,
243 Pac. 93 (1926).
45. People v. Al G. Smith Co., 86 Cal. App. 2d 308, 194 P. 2d
750 (4th Dist. 1948); United States v. Welsh, 217 U. S. 333 (1910);
Bohm v. Metropolitan Ry., 129 N. Y. 576, 29 N. E. 802 (1892); 29
C. J. S. Eminent Domain § 167 p. 1038, n. 27 (1941); 18 AM. JUR.
Eminent Domain § 250, 888 (1938.
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on the existing highway upon which the landowner origi-
nally abutted, he is then forced to travel on a frontage road
and pursue a more circuitous or roundabout route to enter
the same highway to which he originally had direct access.
As a practical matter it is seldom that an abutting property
owner's access is totally obstructed or severely curtailed,
since it has been the accepted practice by highway officials
to permit reasonable access to the existing highways upon
which landowners abut. It has also apparently been the prac-
tice under the interstate program that when existing high-
ways are converted into controlled access facilities, land
service or frontage roads are built for the convenience of
the landowners whose access has been restricted and ade-
quate drive-ways have been provided to the frontage roads.
Notwithstanding provisions for access by an abutting prop-
erty owner through the construction of a frontage road or
other less convenient means of access, it is in this area that
the courts have become perplexed with the problem of deter-
mining whether or not a landowner is entitled to compensa-
tion. The Supreme Court of the United States has said that
nothing in the federal constitution obliges the states to rec-
ognize any particular interest of an abutting landowner in
access to the highway.46 It has, therefore, been left to the
courts of each state to define the landowner's interest and
the courts of different states have often reached different
conclusions. 47 To a great extent, the difference in conclus-
ions is due to the different types of provisions in the state
constitutions with respect to compensation. In some states,
compensation is only allowed under the constitution for "tak-
ing" of property.48 In these states, where no property is phys-
ically taken in the construction of the highway and access is
merely curtailed or diminished, there is ordinarily no com-
pensation to the abutting landowners, since the right of ac-
cess is not superior to proper highway purposes and usages.
This may be reasonably explained on the basis that the
interest acquired by the State in condemnation for high-
way purposes is sufficient under the police power to allow for
46. Saur v. New York, 206 U. S. 536, 548 (1906).
47. Compare People v. Riccardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390, 144 P. 2d 799 (1943),
with Jones Beach Blvd. Estate v. Moses and Iowa State Highway Com-
mission v. Smith, &upr note 21.
48. See CORWIN, RECENT COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING ACCESS CONTROL
AND ALLIED MATTERS (1955), listing states of Alabama, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont and Wisconsin.
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all changes in the character or amount of traffic and for all
improvements which such changes may require, irrespective
of whether or not such developments or changes were, in fact,
considered in fixing the price for the original right of way
on the existing highway. In other states, constitutional or
statutory provisions permit compensation under certain cir-
cumstances for a "damage" to property without a "taking."'4 9
The damage, however, to be compensable, must be different
in kind, not merely in degree, from that sustained by the
community generally.50 There also must be actual damage
before an award will be allowed.5 1
1. "Circuity of Travel"
Even in states where compensation for "damage" without
a taking is allowed, there exist restrictive or limiting doc-
trines. The first doctrine, referred to as "circuity of travel",
has evolved from the use of modern traffic and engineering de-
vices in the construction of controlled access highways. In
recent years, public officials have found it necessary to de-
vise and enforce traffic regulations and prescribe certain
construction standards to make vehicular travel safer and
to insure that the highway and street system will accommo-
date the increasingly heavy burden of automotive traffic.
As has been observed with the interstate program, these im-
provements have been in the form of one-way streets and
highways, grade-crossing eliminations, prohibitions against
U-turns, divided highways and control of entrances and exits
to such highways. The use of these modern traffic and en-
gineering devices has resulted in some "circuity of travel"
as the courts have seen fit to identify this principle. It is
based on the premise that a landowner who retains free ac-
cess to the general system of public highways and streets
makes no case for compensation merely by proving that im-
provements or traffic regulations compelled him to travel
a greater distance or by a more circuitous route to reach or
leave his property. Judicial authority has concluded that such
"circuity of travel" is non-compensable in the absence of
49. See CoRwIN, supra note 48, listing states of Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachus-
etts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Da-
kota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington,
West Virginia, and Wyoming.
50. Bunquist v. Cook, 220 Minn. 48, 19 N. W. 2d 394 (1945) ; Licht v.
State, 277 N. Y. 216, 14 N. B. 2d 44 (1938).
51. Dept. of Public Works and Bldgs. v. Filkins, 411 Ill. 304, 104 N. E.
2d 214 (1952).
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arbitrary action on the basis that the landowner suffers an
inconvenience shared in common with the general public, and
there is no special or peculiar damage to him.52 This doctrine
has been applied to deny payment to a landowner who is forced
to travel further by a prohibition against left turns, by the
establishment of a one-way street,54 and by the erection of
median strips separating opposing traffic lanes of traffic.55
A review of a few of the leading cases clearly illustrate the
thinking behind the "circuity of travel" doctrine. In the Cali-
fornia case of Hlolman v. State,56 the State constructed a
dividing strip eight inches high and six feet wide down the
center of the highway. Its effect upon the landowner's prem-
ises is described in the Court's opinion:
That the building located on the premises of Plaintiff is
especially designed for carrying on the business of serv-
icing and repairing heavy highway trucks and equip-
ment; but prior to the erection of said dividing strip,
Plaintiff's property was easily accessible by heavy truck
traffic proceeding northerly -on the said highway, but as
a proximate result of the construction of such dividing
strip, all reasonable access to Plaintiff's property by all
such north-bound traffic has been prevented and like-
wise, vehicles leaving Plaintiff's property may not cross
the south-bound lane and immediately make a left hand
turn and proceed in a northerly direction, resulting in
the depreciation of the reasonable market value of the
Plaintiff's property.
The California Court then reviewed some of its earlier de-
cisions involving street constructions preventing access from
abutting property because of obstructions placed in the street
or because of the placing of the abutting property owner on
a dead-end street, but factually distinguished these cases from
the Holman case and concluded:
The facts pleaded herein show that the highway upon
52. Wilson v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 90 N. W. 2d 161
(Iowa 1958); Lindley v. Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, 262 P. 2d 159
(Okla. 1953); Cavanaugh v. Gerk, 313 eI. 375, 280 S. W. 51 (1926);
Fort Smith v. Van Zandt, 197 Ark. 91, 122 S. W. 2d 187 (1938) ; Annot.,
100 A. L. R. 491 (1936).
53. Beckman v. State, 64 Cal. App. 2d 487, 149 P. 2d 296 (1944).
54. Cavanaugh v. Gerk, supra note 52.
55. Brady v. Smith, 79 S. E. 2d 851 (W. Va. 1954); People v. Sayig,
101 Cal. App. 2d 890, 226 P. 2d 702 (1951); Fort Smith v. Van Zandt,
supra note 52.
56. 97 Cal. App. 2d 237,2 17 P. 2d 448 (1950).
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which Plaintiff's property abutts is not closed and that
Plaintiffs, once upon the highway to which they have free
access, are in the same position and subject to the same
police power regulations as every other member of the
traveling public. Because of a police power regulation
for the safety of traffic, they are, like all other travelers,
subject to traffic regulations. They are liable to some cir-
cuity of travel in going from their property in a northerly
direction. They are not inconvenienced whatever when
traveling in a southerly direction from their property.
The re-routing or diversion of traffic is a police power
regulation and the incidental result of a lawful act and
not the taking or damaging of a property right. People
v. Ricciardi, supra, 23 Cal. (2d) at page 399, 144 P. (2d)
799.
This decision is quoted in the later California case of People
v. Sayig,57 in which the subject highway was a divided high-
way and the property owners in question upon entering the
highway were required to travel on a one-way street distan-
ces ranging from 500 to 1000 feet to a cross-over where they
could make a "U-turn" and proceed in the opposite direction.
The Court stated:
We also know that mere relocation of a highway thus di-
verting traffic from the property does not legally dam-
age the property.... We also know that the consideration
of a divided highway in front of the property does not
legally damage it.
In the recent West Virginia case of Brady v. Smith, 58 the
plaintiff, in asking for an injunction, alleged that the con-
struction of the proposed median strip would require all east-
bound traffic on U. S. 60 to proceed about 300 feet beyond
his property in order to turn and approach his garage busi-
ness, thereby resulting in substantial damage to the business.
In dissolving a temporary injunction granted by the lower
court and dismissing the complaint, the Supreme Court of
Appeals said:
Nor does the Bill of Complaint expressly or inferentially
allege that the Plaintiff has suffered, or will suffer, in-
jury from the proposed construction of the center con-
57. See note 55 supra.
53. See note 55 supra.
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crete island or median strip different in kind from that
suffered by other property owners similarly situated.
The cases generally do not attempt to specify how great a
distance or re-routing will be permitted under the police
power without the payment of damages, but one New York
decision has held that five miles is not an unreasonable dis-
tance. In the case of Jones Beach Blvd. Estate v. Moses,59
the landowner complained because a median strip was erected
on a heavily traveled highway for the purpose of eliminat-
ing grade crossings and traffic lights and because U-turns
and left turns were prohibited under certain conditions. To
proceed toward the left from his property on the parkway,
the abutting landowner was first required to travel five miles
in the opposite direction to reach a properly designated turn-
ing point. The Court of Appeals of New York, in dismissing
the complaint, held that the right of access to the highway
means a right to enter upon it but not to use it differently
or in violation of the driving regulations imposed upon other
users of the highway, adopted for the purpose of speeding
up traffic and eliminating danger. In the words of the Court:
"The Plaintiff once upon the highway is treated no differ-
ently than is any other member of the traveling public."
There is not complete agreement with this doctrine, how-
ever, as in one rather recent decision, 60 the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts found it necessary to award damages
for injury to access even though it was shown that a circuitous
means of travel was available to the landowner in reaching
the new highway. The specific Massachusetts statute was
apparently worded and interpreted to require payment for the
damages for loss of access, even when, evidently, an indirect
means of access was present. It is also interesting to note at
this point that Massachusetts is listed among those states
which have either a constitutional or statutory provision per-
mitting compensation for "damage" without a "taking".61
As recently as November, 1958, the Supreme Court of Iowa
in a very comprehensive and well-written decision6" had oc-
casion to pass upon the question of damages in "circuity of
travel" cases. The facts reveal that the plaintiff, one Lelia
Warren, owned two tracts of land abutting on an east-west
59. 268 N. Y. 362, 197 N. E. 313, 100 A. L. R. 487 (1935).
60. Nichols v. Commonwealth, 331 Mass. 581, 122 N. E. 2d (1954).
61. See note 49 supra.
62. Warren v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 93 N. W. 2d 60 (Iowa
1958).
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county road. The Iowa Highway Commission constructed
a north-south fully controlled access interstate highway, clos-
ing off at the boundary line of the interstate highway the
county road between the two parcels owned by Lelia Warren.
Neither parcel was closer than 300 feet from the right-of-
way lines of the interstate highway. The Warrens, operat-
ing the two farms as a unit, were required to travel a cir-
cuitous route of approximately 31/ miles between the two par-
cels. The lower court concluded that the plaintiff suffered
a special damage which was compensable, but the Supreme
Court, in reversing the lower court decision, set forth its
reasoning in unmistakable language:
Many Iowa cases have dealt with some facet of the ques-
tion here presented. To the casual reader they may appear
to be in confusion, and some in conflict with others. But
we think the seeming contradictions are more apparent
than real, and that upon careful analysis of the cases
the true rule appears with reasonable certainty. It is that
one whose right of access from his property to an abut-
ting highway is cut off or substantially interfered with
by the vacation or closing of the road has a special prop-
erty which entitles him to damages. But if his access is
not so terminated or obstructed, if he has the same ac-
cess to the highway as he did before the closing, his
damage is not special, but is of the same kind, although
it may be greater in degree, as that of the general public,
and he has lost no property right for which he is en-
titled to compensation.
The principles evolving from the foregoing authorities
is that one whose property abuts upon a highway, a part
of which is closed or vacated has no special damage if
his lands do not abut upon the closed or vacated portion
so that his right of ingress and egress is not affected. If
he has the same access to the general highway system as
before, his injury is the same kind as that suffered by
the general public and is not compensable. It is damnum
absque injuria.
2. Diversion of Traffic
The, second restrictive doctrine, identified by the courts as
the "diversion of traffic" doctrine, holds that a landowner
abutting upon a highway has no vested interest in the con..
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tinuation of the flow of traffic passing his property and that
the diversion of traffic to another route does not result in
compensable damage.0 3 Such diversion of traffic may come
about from the construction of highways or streets or the
relocation of them either vertically or horizontally.0 4 In the
Ohio case of State v. Linzell,65 the Court in a well-written
opinion said:
It is now established doctrine in most jurisdictions that
such an owner has no right to the continuation or main-
tenance of the flow of traffic past his property. The
diminution in the value of land occasioned by a public
improvement that diverts the main flow of traffic from
in front of one's premises is non-compensable. [Citing
authorities] The change in the traffic flow in such a
case is the result of the exercise of the police power or
the incidental result of a lawful act, and is not the tak-
ing or damaging of a property right.
The Alabama Supreme Court in a recent decision 66 aptly
stated the sound reasoning behind the rule. The Court, in
holding that no grounds existed for an injunction which would
prevent the relocation of a highway, said that private induce-
ments or considerations could not rightly enter into the ques-
tion as to whether or not a highway should be constructed at
a particular location. It stated that the controlling factor must
always be the good of the general public, and not the conven-
ience or financial gain of the people who lived along any par-
ticular way.
South Carolina has recognized the "diversion of traffic"
doctrine with respect to land service roads in one of the lead-
ing cases in this state. In the case of Wilson v,. Greenville
County,67 the Court stated:
The owner of land on a public highway has no property
or other vested right in the continuance of it as a high-
way at the public expense. If damage results merely from
its abandonment as a public highway, without its being
63. Wilson v. Iowa State Highway Commission, supra note 52; Pruett
v. Las Vegas, Inc., 216 Ala. 557, 74 So. 2d 807 (1954); Holloway v.
Purcell, 35 Cal. 2d 220, 217 P. 2d 665 (1950); McMinn v. Ander-
son, 189 Va. 289, 52 S. E. 2d 67 (1949); Greer v. City of Texarkana,
147 S. W. 2d 1004 (Ark. 1941); El Paso v. Sandfledger, 118 S. W_
2d 950 (Tex. 1938); 118 A. L. R. 921 (1939).
64. City of Stockton v. Marengo, 137 Cal. 760, 31 P. 2d 467 (1934).
65. 163 Ohio St. 97, 126 N. E. 2d 53 (1955).
66. Pruett v. Las Vegas, Inc-, supra note 63.
67. 110 S. C. 321, 96 S. E. 301 (1918).
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closed, it is damnum absque injuria. Cherry v. Rock Hill,
48 S. C. 553, 26 S. E. 798; Water Company v. City, 53
S. C. 89, 30 S. E. 699; Garraux v. Greenville, 53 S. C. 575,
31 S. E. 597.
3. "Cul-de-sac" Doctrine
'While there does not apparently seem to be the degree of
'harmony among the decisions of the states on the third limit-
ing doctrine, there nevertheless exists what is commonly
known as the "cul-de-sac" doctrine. This doctrine is restric-
tive in that a great many jurisdictions hold that an abutting
landowner is not entitled to compensation when his access
from one direction on a highway is cut off and ade-
quate means of access are left in the other direction.08 The
damages, if any, by the creation of the cul-de-sac are said to
be damnum absque injuria. However, a number of other juris-
'dictions hold that the right of access extends in both direc-
tions, and the blocking of access to the next intersecting
street in one direction is compensable, although access still
exists in the opposite direction to another intersecting street. 9
While there may be apparent lack of harmony in other
states with respect to the "cul-de-sac" doctrine, the Iowa
Supreme Court seems to have settled the question in Iowa
by the following statement :70
It is apparent that the plaintiff here will suffer consider-
able inconvenience in being shut off from a previous di-
rect access to her lands lying west of the point of clos-
ing the secondary road at its intersection with Highway
35. Her home property on the east of the intersection
will lie in a cul-de-sac, and her travel can be only to the
east instead of both east and west. Nevertheless, her
means of access to the general highway system is not im-
paired; that is to say, she has the same means of ingress
and egress to and from her lands as before. Her damage
is greater in degree than that suffered by the general
public; but it is not different in kind, which is the ulti-
68. New York, C & St L. R. R. v. Bucri, 128 Ohio St. 134, 190 N. E.
562 (1934); Krebs v. Uhl, 160 Md. 584, 154 Atl. 131 (1931); City of
Lynchburg v. Peters, 145 Va. 1, 133 S. E. 674 (1926); Freeman v. City
of Centralia, 67 Wash. 142, 120 Pae. 886 (1912) ; Meyer v. City of Rich-
mond, 172 U. S. 82 (1898).
69. See Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P. 2d 818
(1943), and cases cited therein; Annot., 93 A. L. R. 639 (1934); Annot.,
49 A. L. R. 330 (1927).
70. Warren v. Iowa State Highway Commission, supra note 62.
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mate test. The greatest good of the greatest number is
the criterion which the authorities having charge of the
building, alteration, and maintenance of the highway sys-
tems in the State must follow. In the absence of any show-
ing of fraud or bad faith their judgment is final. It can-
not be reviewed by the courts.
C. Measure of Compensation
What conclusion can be reached with respect to the law as
to the proper measure of compensation or damages, if any,
when an existing highway is converted into a controlled ac-
cess facility? A careful analysis of the decisions of the many
states leads one to adopt certain basic views on the subject.
The majority of jurisdictions do not allow an abutting
landowner to ask for more than reasonable access to the gen-
eral system of highways and streets in the vicinity of his
property. In order to recover he must show special damages,
differing in kind, and not merely in degree, from those sus-
tained by the public generally. For instance, where an exist-
ing highway is converted into a controlled access facility with
a complete blocking of all access from the landowner's abut-
ting property to the highway, there is a "taking" or "damage",
as the case may be, for which compensation must be made
under the principle of eminent domain. However, if the im-
provement results in some inconvenience to the abutting
landowner's access, or compels him to pursue a more cir-
cuitous route to reach or leave the highway, or a diversion of
travel in front of his premises, then no compensation need
be paid since these elements are a reasonable exercise of the
police power of the State and any damages resulting there-
from would be considered damnum absque injuria. In every
such situation, reasonable ingress and egress from the land-
owner's premises to the controlled access highway must be
provided by means of a land service or frontage road. These
would appear to be fair and equitable rules, since they rec-
ognize the allowance of compensation where justified but do
not permit compensation where the public safety and welfare
is the paramount consideration and where the damage suf-
fered has not been special to the property owner. Compensa-
tion should be paid when a substantial right has been affected
and a special injury has been suffered, but no individual prop-
erty owner should be permitted to profit at the expense of the
general public when highway construction is greatly needed
1960]
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at economical cost in the interest of the general safety and
welfare of all the citizens.
D. South Carolina View
1. Statutes
In South Carolina, the present status of the law with re-
spect to control of access on existing conventional highways
is not entirely clear. There have been no decisions in this
State on this particular aspect of the problem since the en-
actment of the new controlled access law.7 1 The literal word-
ing of some sections of the statute leads one to infer that the
legislature intended that the State would not be permitted to
totally block access to an existing highway without the allow-
ance of compensation under eminent domain. In conjunction
therewith, the legislature also apparently recognized the au-
thority of the State to restrict a pre-existing easement of ac-
cess by an abutting property owner to an existing highway
under the police power without the payment of compensa-
tion where other reasonable means of access are furnished
the abutting landowner. Section 5 of the Act 72 provides for
the designation of existing highways as controlled access
facilities:
The Department may designate and establish controlled
access highways as new and additional facilities, or an
existing highway may be designated as a controlled ac-
cess facility, or included in a new controlled access fa-
cility, and may provide for the elimination of intersec-
tions at grades with existing state or county roads and
city or town streets, or other public ways, if the public
interest shall be served thereby, or may provide for the
elimination of intersections at grades by closing off in-
tersecting roads or streets at the right-of-way boundary
line of such controlled access facilities.
Section 7 (b) and (c) of the Act73 state in substance that
upon the designation of an existing highway as a controlled
71. Act No. 621 of 1956.
72. 'Se note 71 supra.
73. The specific wording of § 7 (b) and (c) of Act No. 621 of 1956
is as follows:
(b) The Department may issue permits for driveways and side road
entrances or exits as referred to in this Section, and include in such
permits such requirements and restrictions for design and location of
e driveways and side road entrances or exits as may be deemed neces-
sary for the Department to avoid creating a hazard to the traveling
[Vol. 12
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access facility, the Highway Department may close or change
any existing entrance or exit to such existing highway if it
considers such action necessary in the interest of the public
safety, but this may only be done when other reasonable ac-
cess to the existing highway is provided by means of a front-
age road or otherwise.
In addition, the statute specifically gives the landowner,
as an alternative remedy, an added protection against any
arbitrary action in this area by the State Highway Depart-
ment in that provision is made for a hearing by the circuit
court upon the reasonableness of any decision by the Depart-
ment with respect to substitute entrances or exits or other
substitute means of access.
7 4
The above mentioned sections and the headlines75 of the
Controlled Access Statute strongly indicate that the South
Carolina Legislature recognized the problems that have con-
fronted the tribunals of other states with respect to curtail-
ment of pre-existing rights of access and have adequately
covered the situation by legislation. The general import of
this new controlled access legislation leads one to conclude
that the State cannot totally block access to an existing high-
way without payment of compensation to an abutting land-
owner under the power of eminent domain; but, on the other
hand, the State can curtail or diminish a pre-existing right of
access without the payment of compensation under the police
power, if other reasonable means of access are furnished.
This interpretation of the provisions of the controlled access
law would certainly appear to be fair and equitable; it not
only recognizes the right of an abutting property owner to
have reasonable access from his property to the general sys-
public. Such requirements and restrictions may limit the width of such
driveways land side road entrances and exits and restrict the location
of the same. The Department may deny any request for any permit for
any driveway, side road entrance or exit which in the judgment of the
Department may create a hazard to the traveling public. Reasonable
frontage roads or other access roads shall be provided to serve any
property for which a permit for a direct entrance thereto or exit there-
from has been denied, and the Department may construct such frontage
roads as may be deemed necessary.
(c) Any such existing driveway or side road entrance or exit con-
structed prior to the effective date of this Act and adjudged by the De-
partment to be unsafe for the traveling public may be changed by the
Department so as to eliminate any unsafe features, or closed or dis-
placed by substitution therefor of another driveway or side road entrance
or exit at such place or of such design as may be deemed safe, but no
such existing side road or driveway may be closed unless other reason-
able access to the highway is provided by a frontage road or otherwise.
74. Section 7 (e), Act No. 621 of 1956.
75. See Act No. 621 of 1956.
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tern of highways, but it also recognizes the public interest
in modern and efficient highway construction in the advance-
ment of the general public safety and welfare. This view, of
course, is in accordance with the preponderance of authority
on the subject and the current trend of the decisions in other
states under new controlled access legislation.
2. Decisions
Since past decisions of the Supreme Court of South Caro-
lina do not contemplate the above provisions of the new con-
trolled access law, they shed very little light on the Court's
thinking on the legal questions presented upon conversion of
an existing highway into a controlled access road. However,
it is noted with interest that the old case of Cherry v. Rock
Hill, in passing upon the matter of the closing of a public
street or "land service" road, apparently failed to recognize
circuity of travel and inconvenience in access as a basis for
compensation. In dismissing the complaint in this action for
an injuction and damages, the Supreme Court made the fol-
lowing statement, while quoting and referring to an Illinois
decision:
There, as here, the point was made that this was a tak-
ing or damaging private property for public use with-
out just compensation, and was, therefore, forbidden by
the provisions of the Constitution of Illinois, that 'pri-
vate property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation.' The Court, however, held
otherwise, saying: 'It is not true, in fact or in law, that
Defendant has either taken or damaged Plaintiff's prop-
erty for public use. It has taken no property for public
use or any other use. That of which complaint is made is
vacating certain streets. In no sense can that act be con-
strued as either taking or damaging private property for
public use, as those terms are used in the Constitution.'
If that be the rule under the Constitution of Illinois,
which goes further than our Constitution in forbidding
not only the taking but the dcmaging of private property,
how much more should it be the rule here.
In the case of Leitzsey v. Fellers,77 the Court sustained a
non-suit for the defendant in an action by an abutting land-
owner for damages and an injunction to restrain obstruc-
76. 48 S. C. 553, 26 S. E. 798 (1897).
77. 181 S. C. 401, 187 S. E. 740 (1936).
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tion of an alleged neighborhood road on the grounds that the
plaintiff had failed to prove any special damage. As has al-
ready been pointed out, in the case of Wilson v. Greenville
County,7" the Supreme Court clearly recognized that "diver-
sion of traffic" by relocation of a highway does not cause an
abutting property owner any special damages and is, there-
fore, noncompensable. Two later cases 79 which are similar
factually, with the exception that one involves the obstruc-
tion of a city street by a municipality and the other involves
the obstruction of an alleyway by a private individual, ap-
pear to recognize that at least a city or a private individual
cannot totally obstruct the access of an abutting property
owner without payment of compensation, but neither of these
cases seems to be very clear on the matter of curtailment
or restriction of access. Both of these decisions recognize the
existence of the right of access and the later of the two cases,
which cites the first case with approval, states with refer-
ence to destruction of the right of access :s0
These authorities are in line with the generally recog-
nized principle that a property owner has an easement
in a street upon which his property abuts, which is spe-
cial to him and should be protected. While the owner of
a lot on a public street has the same right to the use of
the street that rest in the public, he at the same time
has other rights which are special and peculiar to him;
and the right of ingress and egress is one of them. This
right of access is appurtenant to his lot, and is private
property. To destroy that right is to damage that prop-
erty.
V. CONTROL OF ACCESS UNDER
POLICE POWER OR EMINENT DOMAIN?
It has no doubt become quite obvious that the authorities
generally recognize that the single issue in control of access
cases involves the reconciliation of conflicting interests -
private versus public rights.8' Two distinct powers have been
78. See note 67 supra.
79. City of Rock Hill v. Cothran, 209 S. C. 357, 40 S. E. 2d 239 (1946);
Brown v. Hendricks, 211 S. C. 395, 45 S. E. 2d 603 (1947).
80. Brown v. Hendricks, supra note 79.
81. Lingo v. Page County, 201 Ia. 906, 208 N. W. 327 (1926); 18
AM. JuR. Eminent Donain § 11, p. 639 (1938); Gebelin v. Department
of Highways, 200 La. 409, 8 So. 2d '71 (1942); Huff v. Indiana State
Highway Commission, 149 N. E. 2d 299 (Ind. 1958); Iowa State High-
way Commission v. Warren, supra note 62; Iowa State Highway Com-
mission v. Smith, 248 Ia. 869, 82 N. W. 2d 755 (1957).
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utilized to restrict and control rights of access - the police
power and the power of eminent domain. The police power is
the inherent authority which the State has to restrict property
rights in the promotion of the public health, safety, morals and
general welfare, without incurring liability for any result-
ing injury to private individuals. Eminent domain is the
power of the sovereign to take or damage private property
for a public purpose upon payment of just compensation.
The issue most difficult to resolve in any given case is the
determination of where the police power ends and the power
of eminent domain begins. Salient recognition of this prob-
lem is given in a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin :82
The general rule is that damage resulting to property
through the exercise of the police power is not compen-
sable. We consider the following statement appearing in
11 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations (3rd. ed.) p. 319,
Section 32.27, to be particularly pertinent to the facts
of the instant case: 'The question of what constitutes
a taking is often interwoven with the question of
whether a particular act is an exercise of the police
power or the power of eminent domain. If the act is a
proper exercise of the police power, the Constitutional
provision that private property shall not be taken for
public use, unless compensation is made, is not appli-
cable.'
At least one court has suggested that the police power ends
when the injury to the property owner in not being paid for
his property is greater than the injury to the public in hav-
ing to pay for the property.
8 3
The ultimate decision in any case as to whether a right of
access ought to be taken without paying for it can only be
made fairly and equitably by weighing and balancing the
need for the property, the injury to the property owner, and
the burden of compensation upon the public. This fair and
just approach to the issue has been very recently recognized
by the following apt quotation from a decision of the Iowa
Supreme Court:8 4
No hard and fast rule can be stated as to whether an
82. Carazalla v. State of Wisconsin, 269 Wis. 593, 71 N. W. 2d 276
(1955).
83. See Justice Edmonds' concurring opinion in Bacich v. Board of
Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P. 2d 818 (1943).
84. Iowa State Highway Commission v. Smith, supra note 81.
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abutting property owner has been denied access that is
reasonable or, as we have said, 'free and convenient'. In
most instances the question is one of fact, not of law, and
its determination depends largely upon the evidence in
the particular case.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, a review of the leading cases through-
out many states reflects a current trend by the courts to sus-
tain the right of the individual states to control access upon
the highways according to their own judgment, and with-
out equivalent liability on the state to allow compensation to
abutting property owners in every instance. This has, no
doubt, resulted from the salient recognition by the courts of
the commanding public obligation of the states to provide a
modern, safe and efficient highway system adequately de-
signed to meet the requirements of increasing traffic con-
gestion and the ever-mounting toll of highway accidents
and fatalities. These obvious motivations for control of high-
way access have been recognized by the legislatures of the
various states, including South Carolina, as will more fully
appear by reference to the headlines or policy declarations
in the various acts.s5 The controlled access highway is in its
incubation or developmental stage and the corresponding
law 6n this subject is likewise being established and inter-
preted in the light of the public necessity. There is currently
a paucity of decisions by appellate courts reviewing this type
of legislation in many of our states and South Carolina has
none to date. But, even in this State, it has been interesting
to note the rulings by the circuit courts within the last three
years with respect to legal questions involving control of ac-
cess on roads which are being constructed under the inter-
state program. Since early in 1957 the writer has had the
opportunity to participate in a number of trials in the cir-
cuit courts of the State involving control of highway access
under the new statute. In interpreting the act, it has been
the observation of the writer that our circuit courts have
been in complete harmony in their rulings on practically all
legal questions arising from control of access on new loca-
tions; but, like many appellate jurisdictions of other states,
85. See Justice Thompson's discussion of "Declaration of Policy" in
controlled access statute of State of Iowa in Warren v. Iowa State
Highway Commission, supra note 62. See note 75 supra.
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they have been divided in their rulings on legal questions
arising from control of access on existing highways.
The next decade - the challenging 60's, a new era of high-
way and economic development - should envisage the crystal-
lization and unification of judicial and legislative approach to
this very vital subject. The issue between the police power
and the power of eminent domain has been joined, and the
courts must adjudicate the factual and legal differences be-
tween the two and attempt to arrive at results which will be
fair to both the property owner and the public. Fairness and
justice will require clear and analytical reasoning, as the
future course of highway development will be profoundly in-
fluenced by judicial determination of the basic issues. It is,
therefore, hoped that future judicial action will not pursue a
course which will in any manner serve to discourage much
needed highway improvement.
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